

Message Text

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ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 R

66011
DRAFTED BY S/S-O:SRPVALERGA:WLT
APPROVED BY S/S-O:SRPVALERGA

-----052446 312321Z /73
O 312202Z DEC 77 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE
WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 311193 TOSEC 130088

NODIS

FOLLOWING REPEAT RABAT 7155 ACTION SECSTATE 31 DEC 77

QUOTE

S E C R E T RABAT 7155

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PLEASE PASS TO THE SECRETARY AND NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR
BRZEZINSKI

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: MO XF MASS UR
SUBJECT: KING HASSAN'S AUDIENCE WITH SENATOR BIRCH BAYH ON
DECEMBER 29, 1977

1. SUMMARY: KING HASSAN STRESSED TO SENATOR BAYH THE NEED
FOR CONTINUED MOMENTUM IN MIDDLE EAST PEACE EFFORTS AND FOR
FLEXIBILITY ON THE PART OF ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER BEGIN ON

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THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION. ALTHOUGH TRADITIONALLY A FIRM
SUPPORTER OF THE PLO, HE CALLED FOR BEGIN'S ACCEPTANCE OF A
FUTURE PALESTINIAN LEADERSHIP COMPOSED OF A MIX OF MODERATES
FROM THE FATAH AND FROM PALESTINIANS NOW LIVING ON WEST BANK.
HE REVIEWED THE SOVIET THREAT IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AREA AND
AFRICA, CHARACTERIZING CURRENT MIDDLE EAST PEACE EFFORTS AS
THE CRITICAL "FIRST ROUND" AGAINST THE SOVIETS. IF THIS ROUND

IS LOST, WESTERN MEDITERRANEAN WOULD ALSO BE LOST AND SOVIET EXPANSIONIST OBJECTIVES IN AFRICA WOULD BE ENHANCED. IN REPLY TO SENATOR'S QUERY, HE ALSO BRIEFLY DISCUSSED THE MOROCCAN ARMS REQUEST, EMPHASIZING MOROCCO'S DESIRE TO BE SELF-RELIANT AND REITERATING THAT US-FURNISHED ARMS WOULD BE USED ONLY FOR SELF-DEFENSE. END SUMMARY.

2. KING HASSAN RECEIVED SENATOR BAYH FOR A WIDE-RANGING, ONE-HOUR AND FORTY-MINUTE AUDIENCE IN MARRAKECH ON DECEMBER 29. ALSO PRESENT WERE FONMIN BOUCETTA, ROYAL COUNSELORS GUEDIRA, SLAOUI AND BOUTALEB, MOROCCAN AMBASSADOR TO U.S. ALI BENGELLOUN, AND MYSELF. SENATOR SPOKE IN ENGLISH WITH NO TRANSLATION NEEDED; KING SPOKE IN FRENCH; I SERVED AS INTERPRETER.

3. KING WELCOMED SENATOR WARMLY, NOTING THAT EVEN THOUGH HE WAS A YOUNG SENATOR, HE ALREADY HAD REPUTATION OF A STATESMAN. KING SAID HE UNDERSTOOD SENATOR HAD ARRIVED FROM ISRAEL AND THEREFORE LOOKED FORWARD TO EXCHANGING VIEWS ON THE MIDDLE EAST. SENATOR EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR FRIENDLY RECEPTION AND HOSPITALITY IN MOROCCO, AND LED OFF SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION BY REFERRING TO WIDESPREAD RECOGNITION BOTH IN U.S. AND INTERNATIONALLY OF KING'S PROMPT AND FIRM PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR SADAT'S HISTORIC INITIATIVE.

4. IN RESPONSE TO SENATOR'S REQUEST FOR KING'S THINKING ON MIDDLE EAST FOLLOWING ISMAILIA SUMMIT, HASSAN SAID HE HAD SECRET

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RECEIVED MESSAGE PREVIOUS DAY FROM SADAT WHICH HAD NOT BEEN VERY OPTIMISTIC. KING UNDERLINED THAT MOMENTUM MUST BE MAINTAINED IN PEACE EFFORTS, WITH MAIN PROBLEM NOW BEING PALESTINIAN QUESTION. BEGIN MUST BEGIN TO SHOW MORE FLEXIBILITY AND NOW WAS THE TIME FOR THE WHITE HOUSE TO PUT PRESSURE ON HIM. KING COMMENTED THAT BEGIN TRAUMATIZED BY THE MERE WORD "PALESTINIAN", AND THAT THE WORD "NEVER" SHOULD NOT BE IN THE VOCABULARY OF PRACTITIONERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

5. HASSAN EMPHASIZED THAT HE DID NOT MAINTAIN THAT PLO MUST BE SOLE REPRESENTATIVE OF ALL PALESTINIANS. PLO, LIKE MOST POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS, HAD TWO FACTIONS -- THE RIGHT AND THE LEFT. IN THE PLO, THE RIGHT COMPOSED OF THE MODERATES IS REPRESENTED BY THE FATAH. THE GOAL NOW MUST BE TO TRY TO FIND THE PROPER MIX FOR THE PALESTINIAN LEADERSHIP OF THE FUTURE. SUCH A MIX WOULD IDEALLY CONTAIN MODERATE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE FATAH AND OF THE PALESTINIANS LIVING ON THE WEST BANK.

6. CONCERNING ARAFAT, HASSAN RELATED THAT THE PLO LEADER HAD TOLD A MOROCCAN EMISSARY RECENTLY IN DAMASCUS THAT HE WAS A PRISONER OF THE SYRIANS AND THEREFORE NOT ABLE TO BE FLEXIBLE BECAUSE THE 300,000 PALESTINIANS IN LEBANON WERE IN ESSENCE

BEING HELD AS HOSTAGES OF THE 30,000 SYRIAN TROOPS STATIONED IN THAT COUNTRY. ARAFAT HAD ALSO TOLD SADAT RECENTLY OF HIS INABILITY TO ACT BECAUSE OF SYRIA. ARAFAT HAD SAID HE WOULD BE HAPPY TO LIVE IN EGYPT UNDER SADAT'S PROTECTION, BUT UNFORTUNATELY HE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO BRING THE 300,000 PALESTINIANS FROM LEBANON WITH HIM, AS THEY WERE HOSTAGES THERE.

7. SENATOR BAYH COMMENTED THAT IT WAS INDEED IN THE INTEREST OF ISRAEL, JORDAN, EGYPT AND OTHERS SUCH AS MOROCCO TO HAVE A MODERATE PALESTINIAN REGIME IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA WHICH WOULD NOT THREATEN ANYONE. IN AGREEING, KING REPLIED THAT HE COULD ASSURE THE SENATOR THAT THE ARAB STATES SUPPORTING SADAT'S INITIATIVE WOULD PROVIDE ANY GUARANTEE REQUIRED, NO MATTER HOW COSTLY, TO ASSURE THAT A WISE, MODERATE PALESTINIAN

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LEADERSHIP WOULD NOT BE A THREAT BUT WOULD PURSUE A POLICY OF PEACE. BASED ON ASSESSMENTS OF HIS EMISSARIES WHO HAD JUST RETURNED FROM TALKS WITH VIRTUALLY ALL ARAB LEADERS IN MIDDLE EAST, HASSAN LISTED FOLLOWING ARAB STATES AS SUPPORTERS OF SADAT'S INITIATIVE: TUNISIA (EVEN THOUGH IT COULD NOT SPEAK OUT BECAUSE IT WAS SMALL, WEAK AND HAD A FOOL ON EACH SIDE), SUDAN, SAUDI ARABIA, KUWAIT, ALL THE GULF STATES, AND JORDAN.

8. ON THE REJECTIONIST SIDE, THE KING CONTINUED, ALGERIA, IRAQ, LIBYA AND SYRIA REPRESENTED A COMBINATION THAT WAS DOOMED TO FAIL. IN THE LONG RUN, ALGERIA AND THE PLO WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO COOPERATE, NOR WOULD SYRIA AND LIBYA, NOR LIBYA AND IRAQ. THE DYNAMICS FOR SUCH COOPERATION JUST DID NOT EXIST. ONLY A REFUSAL BY BEGIN TO BE FLEXIBLE ON THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION, INCLUDING WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT A MODERATE PALESTINIAN LEADERSHIP FOR A HOMELAND IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, COULD UNITE THE REJECTIONISTS TEMPORARILY AND THUS GIVE THE SOVIET UNION ITS LONG-AWAITED OPENING TO REGAIN INFLUENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

9. SENATOR BAYH SAID HE COULD UNDERSTAND THAT SADAT'S MESSAGE MIGHT NOT HAVE BEEN OPTIMISTIC. NOTHING COULD HAVE BEEN MORE SPECTACULAR OR HISTORIC THAN SADAT'S VISIT TO JERUSALEM, AND IT WOULD HAVE BEEN UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT ANOTHER MIRACLE FROM BEGIN'S TRIP TO ISMAILIA. THE SENATOR ADDED THAT FROM HIS FRUITFUL TALK WITH BEGIN IN ISRAEL THE PREVIOUS DAY, HE WAS CONFIDENT BEGIN WOULD IN FACT BE FLEXIBLE. HE HAD BEEN IMPRESSED WITH BEGIN'S POSITIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD SADAT AS AN HONEST, SINCERE, AND COURAGEOUS MAN WHO WANTED PEACE, AND BELIEVED SADAT HELD A SIMILAR VIEW TOWARDS BEGIN. THIS IN ITSELF AUGURS WELL FOR CONTINUED EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE PEACE, AND ISMAILIA WAS ANOTHER IMPORTANT STEP IN CONTINUING

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THE MOMENTUM. OF PARTICULAR INTEREST TO HASSAN WAS THE SENATOR'S COMMENT THAT BEGIN VIEWED HIS PEACE PLAN AS THOROUGHLY NEGOTIABLE AND NOT AT ALL AS THE LAST WORD.

10. KING CONSIDERED SENATOR'S THOUGHTS ACCURATE AND PREDICTED BEGIN WOULD ULTIMATELY TAKE A FLEXIBLE APPROACH, BUT HE SHOULD RECOGNIZE TIME WAS OF THE ESSENCE. THE LONGER THE PROBLEM DRAGGED ON IN A NO-PEACE-NO-WAR SITUATION, THE GREATER THE BENEFIT TO THE SOVIETS. BECAUSE OF HIS CONVICTION THAT COMMITTEES ARE ALL TOO OFTEN SET UP MERELY TO BURY PROBLEMS, HASSAN WAS CONCERNED THAT THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY COMMITTEES IN JERUSALEM AND CAIRO WOULD NOT WORK RAPIDLY ENOUGH. IN HIS VIEW THE COMMITTEES MUST WORK DILIGENTLY TOWARD A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT AND NOT BE PERMITTED TO BECOME BOGGED DOWN IN INCONSEQUENTIAL DETAILS WHICH WOULD AVOID THE REAL ISSUES.

11. HASSAN NEXT SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO GIVE HIS PERSONAL PERCEPTIONS, RIGHT OR WRONG, OF THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE MIDDLE EAST TO THE REST OF THE MEDITERRANEAN AND TO AFRICA AS IT CONCERNED THE EXPANSIONIST OBJECTIVES OF THE SOVIET UNION. STARTING WITH THE NORTHERN MEDITERRANEAN, YUGOSLAVIA'S FUTURE WAS UNCERTAIN BECAUSE OF TITO'S SUCCESSION. IN ITALY, THE COMMUNISTS HAD THE VOTES TO TAKE POWER NOW. IN FRANCE, NO ONE COULD PREDICT THE OUTCOME OF THE MARCH ELECTIONS. IN SPAIN, THERE WAS AN ACTIVE LEFTIST OPPOSITION. AS IT HAS NOT BEEN AN ELEMENT OF POWER FOR 40 YEARS, ITS IDEALISTIC, NEBULOUS, IMPRACTICAL APPROACH TO GOVERNMENT WAS NOT CONDUCIVE TO FUTURE POLITICAL STABILITY IN SPAIN.

12. AS FOR MOROCCO, KING WEST ON, "WE HAVE OUR PROBLEMS" BUT DO REPRESENT A COUNTRY OF STABILITY AND HOPE AGAINST SOVIET INROADS. KING SAID HE WOULD NOT TALK OF SAHARA, WHICH COULD BE DEALT WITH LATER BY FOREIGN MINISTER AND HIS OTHER ADVISORS, BUT PREFERRED TO CONCENTRATE ON GLOBAL PERCEPTIONS OF SOVIET OBJECTIVES.

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13. ALGERIA WAS OF COURSE HEAVILY SUPPLIED WITH SOVIET WEAPONS AND ORIENTED TOWARD MOSCOW, KING CONTINUED. AS FOR LIBYA, HE WONDERED IF SENATOR KNEW IT HAD RECENTLY PURCHASED \$3 BILLION WORTH OF SOVIET ARMS AND EQUIPMENT. AFTER SUGGESTING HE COULD VERIFY DETAILED FIGURES FROM INTELLIGENCE AT PRESIDENT CARTER'S DISPOSAL, HE NOTED THE SOVIET HAD 1,500 TANKS IN LIBYA, RANGING FROM T-56S TO T-72S. SUCH SOVIET WEAPONS WOULD

PROBABLY BE USED TO MOUNT "ANOTHER ANGOLA", A RESUMPTION OF GUERRILLA ACTIVITY IN ZAIRE, OR INROADS ELSEWHERE. WITH THE LIBYANS THEMSELVES UNABLE TO OPERATE SUCH EQUIPMENT FOR ANOTHER 25 YEARS, IT HAD TO BE MANNED BY CUBANS OR RUSSIANS. TO COMPLETE PICTURE OF SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN LITTORAL, ONE MUST ALSO BE CONCERNED ABOUT TUNISIA WITH ITS VIRTUALLY NON-EXISTENT PRESIDENT AND ITS ONLY POLITICAL PARTY, THE DESTOUR, WHICH COULD WELL FRAGMENT INTO GROUPINGS OF THE LEFT AND THE RIGHT.

14. KING THEN TURNED TO SOVIET DESIGNS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA, WHERE THEY WERE GAINING INFLUENCE IN ETHIOPIA WITH THE AIM OF WEAKENING SUDAN AND ULTIMATELY EGYPT. WITH SAUDI ARABIA, A BULWARK OF ANTI-COMMUNISM ONLY 30 KMS AWAY, IT IS LITTLE WONDER WHY THE SOVIETS WILL STILL TRY TO REMAIN IN SOMALIA AND TO CONCENTRATE ON SOUTH YEMEN IN ORDER TO CONTROL THE ENTRANCE TO THE RED SEA. IF SUCH PRESSURES SUCCEEDED IN INSTALLING A "PROGRESSIVE REGIME" IN THE HOLY COUNTRY OF SAUDI ARABIA, ALL MUSLIMS -- "INCLUDING MYSELF EVEN IF I WERE 70" -- WOULD LAUNCH A HOLY WAR WITH EVERYTHING THEY HAD IN ORDER TO SAVE MECCA.

15. IN VIEW OF FOREGOING SCENARIO, HASSAN SAW THE CURRENT SITUATION IN MIDDLE EAST AS THE "FIRST ROUND" OF THE BATTLE AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION. THIS ROUND WAS CRITICAL. IF IT WERE LOST, THE WESTERN MEDITERRANEAN WOULD AUTOMATICALLY BE LOST AND THE WHOLE MEDITERRANEAN WOULD BECOME A "MACABRE LAKE OF
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FOLLY". THIS WAS WHY KING, AND OTHERS WHO SHARED HIS THINKING, COMPLETELY SUPPORTED SADAT'S INITIATIVE, WHICH WAS IMPERATIVE TO WIN THE FIRST ROUND. IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, BEGIN SHOULD RECOGNIZE THAT TIMES HAVE CHANGED, AND THAT THE PROBLEM WAS NO LONGER ONE OF ISRAEL AGAINST THE ARABS. IT WAS NOW ISRAEL AND THE WISE ARABS AGAINST THE TRIPOLI REJECTIONISTS AND THE SOVIETS. IF THE WISE DID NOT SUCCEED, ISRAEL, WHICH WOULD NEVER ACCEPT COMMUNISM, WOULD REMAIN A SMALL ISLAND SURROUNDED BY RADICAL PRO-COMMUNIST ARAB STATES, AND ITS FUTURE THEREFORE DOOMED. THIS MUST BE BROUGHT HOME TO BEGIN.

16. WHILE THE SOVIETS PROVIDED AID TO SYRIA AND HAD A CERTAIN RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAQ, KING NOTED, ASSAD WAS BASICALLY WISE. HE HAD A DEEP RESPECT FOR DR. KISSINGER, AND THIS RESPECT WAS RECIPROCAL. IT MIGHT THEREFORE BE USEFUL IF DR. KISSINGER COULD MEET QUIETLY WITH ASSAD TO ENCOURAGE HIS EVENTUAL PARTICIPATION IN THE PEACE PROCESS. IN IRAQ, THERE WAS A PRO-SOVIET AND AN ANTI-SOVIET FACTION. IF BEGIN SHOWED THE NECESSARY FLEXIBILITY ON THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION, THE LATTER TENDENCY COULD BE FOSTERED AND RESULT IN IRAQ'S TURNING AWAY FROM DEPENDENCE ON THE SOVIET UNION.

17. SENATOR BAYH AGREED WITH THE KING'S OVERALL ASSESSMENT, AND SAID HE WOULD REPORT HIS CONVERSATION TO THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY. HE SUGGESTED IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR BEGIN TO HEAR DIRECTLY FROM THE KING ABOUT HIS THINKING ON THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION AND THE NEED FOR FLEXIBILITY. ASKED IF HIS VIEWS COULD ALSO BE PASSED TO AMBASSADOR DINITZ IN WASHINGTON, HASSAN SAID HE HAD NO OBJECTION. THE SENATOR CONTINUED BY NOTING HIS IMPRESSION THAT THE TWO EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI COMMITTEES WOULD WORK RAPIDLY, RECOGNIZING THE NEED TO MOVE WITHOUT DELAY TO A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT. BEGIN WAS A REALIST AND WANTED PEACE, BUT AT THE SAME TIME HAD TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT SOME INTERNAL OPPOSITION, SUCH AS THE VICE PRIME MINISTER, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE KNESSET'S FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE AND FORMER FOREIGN MINISTER ALLON. WHILE THERE WERE SOME IN ISRAEL WHO FELT HE
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HAD CONCEDED TOO MUCH TOO EARLY, RECENT POLLS IN ISRAEL DEMONSTRATED AN INCREASING DESIRE FOR PEACE AND GROWING SUPPORT FOR BEGIN.

18. KING AGREED WITH THE SENATOR'S COMMENTS, ADDING THAT THERE SHOULD BE A STRONG EFFORT NOW TO SENSITIZE ISRAELI PUBLIC OPINION ON THE NEED FOR MOVEMENT, AND FOR FLEXIBILITY REGARDING THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION. AS FOR THE WHITE HOUSE AND CONGRESS, THEY SHOULD WORK ON THE ISRAELI LOBBY IN THE U.S., WHICH WAS FAR MORE INFLEXIBLE THAN THE ISRAELIS THEMSELVES.

19. THE SENATOR EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR KING'S LEADERSHIP, REFERRING TO THE MOROCCAN INITIATIVE IN ZAIRE, WHICH WAS RECEIVED WITH ADMIRATION AND RESPECT, AS WAS THE KING'S SUPPORT FOR SADAT. IT WAS CLEAR THAT MOROCCAN VALUES WERE THE SAME AS OURS AND THAT WE WERE BOTH STRIVING TOWARD THE SAME OBJECTIVES -- PEACE AND THE PREVENTION OF SOVIET EXPANSIONISM. THE SENATOR ASKED WHAT THE U.S. COULD DO TO HELP MOROCCO MORE.

20. KING REPLIED THAT IT WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL TO MOROCCO AND OTHER FRIENDS OF THE U.S. IF THE ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PEOPLE AND WHITE HOUSE COULD AGREE ON THE NATURE OF U.S. INTERESTS ABROAD. IT WAS ONE THING TO BE AT VARIANCE ON DOMESTIC ISSUES, BUT ON FOREIGN POLICY THE TWO SHOULD BE UNITED. TO ACCOMPLISH THIS WOULD BE THE GREATEST SERVICE THE SENATOR COULD RENDER TO HIS COUNTRY. SENATOR BAYH AGREED, BUT NOTED THAT IN THE AFTERMATH OF VIETNAM, WHERE WE MADE OUR ERRORS EVEN THOUGH OUR MOTIVES WERE SOUND, THERE WERE TWO TENDENCIES -- (A) RETURN TO ISOLATIONISM AND LIVE WITHIN FORTRESS AMERICA, OR (B) LIVE IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD AND WORK WITH OUR FRIENDS. WHILE STILL A PROBLEM NOT FULLY RESOLVED, HE WAS CONFIDENT THE LATTER VIEW WOULD PREVAIL. WITH THIS IN MIND, HE WONDERED HOW THE UNITED STATES COULD HELP MOROCCO WHEN
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SOUTHERN MOROCCO AND THE SAHARA WERE UNDER ALGERIAN ATTACK WITH SOVIET ARMS.

21. KING SAID ONE HAD TO UNDERSTAND THE SAHARA PROBLEM. ALGERIA HAD ITS "PLATFORM" ON THE MEDITERRANEAN AND WAS NOW SEEKING A PLATFORM ON THE ATLANTIC. MOROCCO HAD LONG AGO MADE ITS CHOICE. IT WAS IN THE SAME CAMP AS THE U.S. AND WOULD NEVER BE SOVIETIZED OR CONVERTED TO MARXISM. KING SAID HE WOULD NEVER EMBARRASS THE U.S. IF HE WERE IN TROUBLE, HE WOULD NOT ASK THE U.S. TO ENTER AS IT DID IN KOREA AND VIETNAM. IF A CRISIS OCCURRED, IN MOZAMBIQUE OR ANGOLA, FOR EXAMPLE, HE WOULD NOT PRESS FOR THE INTERVENTION BY U.S. TROOPS. HE WAS DETERMINED WITHIN HIS MEANS TO MEET THREATS FROM THE SOVIET UNION WHEREVER THEY OCCURRED IN AFRICA. IF A THREAT AROSE, HE MIGHT ASK THE U.S. TO SELL THE WHEREWITHAL TO MEET IT. BUT THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER FRIENDS JUST HAD TO REALIZE HE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO FACE THE SOVIETS WITHOUT HELP, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME MOVING FORWARD WITH URGENTLY NEEDED ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS.

22. ASKED ABOUT THE STATUS OF U.S. ARMS SALES TO MOROCCO, THE KING SAID THERE WERE TWO QUESTIONS THAT CAME TO MIND. FIRST WAS THE SALE OF REDEYE MISSILES WHICH HAD BEEN TURNED DOWN BECAUSE OF THE SENSITIVITY OF SOME OF ITS COMPONENTS. HE UNDERSTOOD THIS DECISION, BUT FELT THE CHANCES OF SUCH EQUIPMENT FALLING INTO ENEMY HANDS WERE REMOTE BECAUSE OF THE NATURE OF HIS DEFENSIVE REQUIREMENTS. (I SUBSEQUENTLY TOLD SENATOR BAYH IT WAS MY RECOLLECTION THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD NOT APPROVED THE SALE OF THE WEAPON TO ANY FOREIGN COUNTRY.) THE SECOND QUESTION CONCERNED THE SALE OF OV-10 AIRCRAFT. THE KING SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THE WHITE HOUSE HAD APPROVED THE SALE, AND THAT THE SALE WAS NOW AWAITING CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL. AMBASSADOR BENGLOUN INTERJECTED THAT THE FILE WAS STILL BEING CONSIDERED IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT, AND THAT HE WOULD EXPLAIN THE DETAILS LATER.

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23. THE KING CONTINUED THAT IRAN AND THAILAND WERE PLACING NEW ORDERS FOR OV-10S WITH ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL AND THAT MOROCCO WAS PLANNING TO ORDER 24. AS IT WOULD BE 18 MONTHS BEFORE THE FIRST NEW AIRCRAFT CAME OFF THE PRODUCTION LINE, THE U.S. MARINE CORPS HAD OFFERED TO PROVIDE SIX USED PLANES FROM ITS OWN INVENTORY. THESE AIRCRAFT WERE URGENTLY NEEDED FOR MOROCCAN DEFENSE. MOROCCO WOULD NEVER USE U.S. ARMS TO ATTACK

ANOTHER COUNTRY. SUCH ARMS WOULD BE USED ONLY FOR THE DEFENSE OF MOROCCO OR TO HELP FRIENDS WHO REQUESTED ASSISTANCE AND WHO WERE ALSO FRIENDS OF THE U.S. WHAT IF MALI OR SENEGAL WERE ATTACKED, HE ASKED RHETORICALLY. IF THEY HAD MUTUAL DEFENSE PACTS WITH MOROCCO, IT WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE NECESSARY TO HELP THEM. AS AN ASIDE, HE RAISED AND IMMEDIATELY DISMISSED THE THOUGHT HIS ARMS WOULD EVER BE USED AGAINST ISRAEL, COMMENTING THAT SUCH A MOVE WOULD BE TOTALLY ILLOGICAL IN VIEW OF HIS SUPPORT OF SADAT, HIS OPPOSITION TO THE REJECTIONISTS, AND THE IMPERATIVE FOR HIS OWN COUNTRY TO CONTRIBUTE TO A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT WITH ISRAEL.

24. THE SENATOR SAID HE WOULD DISCUSS THE MATTER WITH THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY. HE FELT IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE IN FORMULATING ITS ARMS REQUESTS FOR MOROCCO TO EMPHASIZE ITS OWN DEFENSE, RATHER THAN ASSISTANCE TO OTHER COUNTRIES. HE SAID HE WOULD ALSO DISCUSS THE ISSUE WITH COLLEAGUES IN THE SENATE. THERE WAS NO QUESTION THAT THE U.S. SHOULD HELP ONE OF ITS BEST FRIENDS TO DEFEND AGAINST ATTACKS AGAINST MOROCCO AND MAURITANIA ACROSS INTERNATIONAL BORDERS.

25. IN CLOSING, THE KING SAID THAT HE HOPES HE AND THE SENATOR WOULD CONTINUE THEIR DIALOGUE THROUGH AMBASSADOR BENGELOUN IN WASHINGTON AND MYSELF IN RABAT, AND HE WAS PLEASED THIS HAD NOT JUST BEEN A COURTESY CALL, BUT A USEFUL WORKING MEETING. AFTER THE RARE GESTURE OF ESCORTING THE SECRET

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SENATOR TO THE COURTYARD, KING HASSAN SAID HE WOULD BE SENDING A PERSONAL INVITATION TO THE SENATOR TO RETURN TO MOROCCO, PERHAPS WITH THE RECOMMENDATION HE ONCE AGAIN COME VIA JERUSALEM.
ANDERSON.
UNQUOTE CHRISTOPHER".

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptoning: Z
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: KING, PEACE, CAT-B, VISITS, MEETINGS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 31-Dec-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 22 May 2009
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977STATE311193
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: O:SRPVALERGA:WLT
Enclosure: REPEAT OF RABAT 7155
Executive Order: X1
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: N780001-0074
Format: TEL
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 2
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t1977121/aaaaaabg.tel
Line Count: 424
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 63dc20fb-c188-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ORIGIN NODS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 8
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 19-Apr-2005 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 100143
Secure: LOCK1
Status: NATIVE
Subject: KING HASSAN'S AUDIENCE WITH SENATOR BIRCH BAYH ON DECEMBER 29, 1977
TAGS: MASS, MO, XF, UR, US, (HASSAN II), (BAYH, BIRCH)
To: SECRETARY WHITE HOUSE
Type: TE
vdkvgwkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/63dc20fb-c188-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009